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When President Reagan signed S. 883, the Export Administration
Amendments Act of 1985 (the "1985 Act") into law on July 12, 1985,' he
noted that the new legislation ". . . involves a delicate balancing of national
as well as programmatic objectives.. ." and that it ".... strikes an acceptable
balance between enhancing our commercial interests and protecting our
national security interests ... . These bland, upbeat characterizations
scarcely hint at the intense turf battles and deep philosophical differences
that were aired during a renewal process that spanned more than three years
and resulted in one of the longest House-Senate conferences in recent
memory.
I. History of the Act
The 1985 Act reauthorized and amended U.S. export controls which, in
one form or another, have been extant for more than four decades. Origi-
nally conceived during World War II to avert shortages of basic commod-
ities,3 export controls came to reflect concerns with national security and
foreign policy as political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
worsened following the war. Under the Export Control Act of 1949, 4
prospective exports were reviewed by the Department of Commerce in
terms of their possible military significance, and major revisions to the law
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3. 50 U.S.C. app. 701, as amended June 30, 1942, c. 461, 56 Stat. 463.
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were enacted in the Export Administration Acts of 19695 and 19796 which
added foreign policy concerns as criteria for the imposition and administra-
tion of export controls, as well as sharpening and redefining the scope of
national security controls. In 1965, the first Arab boycott amendments to the
basic legislation 7 appeared which, along with short supply controls, 8 have
found a permanent home in this law.
The Export Control Act of 1949 and its progeny, of course, are not the
only legislative mechanisms which impose export controls. The Arms Ex-
port Control Act of 19769 authorizes the control of commercial arms exports
(i.e., export sales of those items which appear on the Munitions List)' 0 by
the Department of State. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1' and the
Department of Energy 12 also are authorized to control exports of certain
commodities and technologies with which they are particularly familiar. But
in terms of regulating commercial exports, the agencies having the greatest
interest in these transactions-Commerce, State, Defense, and the National
Security Council-comprise the "export control community" and assert the
greatest influence in determining which commodities and technologies will
be permitted to go to which consignees in which countries.
In addition to license activities, enforcement of these controls had been
administered by the Department of Commerce and, where appropriate, the
Department of Justice. By 1981, however, the Customs Service had joined
the fray with "Operation EXODUS"-a code name for what amounted to a
strike force to interdict illegal exports-thereby laying the groundwork for
one of the most bitter and acrimonious jurisdictional struggles reflected in
the 1985 Act.
II. Conflicts and Compromises of the 1985 Act
The compromises reflected in the 1985 Act cannot be comprehended
without understanding the nature and strength of the interests which com-
peted in the process. The stage for these conflicts was set long before
renewal bills were introduced in the 98th Congress. In reauthorizing the
export control law in 1979, Congress was told by the business community
that export controls were cumbersome, unfairly and unevenly administered,
and in some instances were unnecessary because many of our trading
partners were able to freely provide equivalent goods and technologies to a
5. Pub. L. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841.
6. Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420.
7. Pub. L. 89-63, 79 Stat. 209.
8. 50 U.S.C. app. 2406.
9. Pub. L. 94-324, 22 U.S.C. 2778-2779.
10. 22 C.F.R. 121.01.
11. 42 U.S.C. 2047, 2155.
12. 42 U.S.C. 6212.
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marketplace which U.S. suppliers no longer dominated. At the same time,
relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had improved, and public
concern with human rights in the Republic of South Africa was diffuse.
The resultant reauthorization-the Export Administration Act of
197913-- reflected many of the concerns of the business community by im-
posing for the first time, for example, specific time limits on the Commerce
Department for the processing of export license applications. 14 More signifi-
cantly, the reauthorization period was a brief four years. 15 In that relatively
short period, however, conditions affecting export control policy changed
remarkably. Congress thus was obliged to face another renewal of the law in
the face of increased concerns from the defense establishment over the
leakage of critical technologies to the Russians, as well as continued com-
plaints from the business community about slow processing of license ap-
plications. Against the backdrop of the change in control of the Senate,
generally miserable relations with the Soviet Union, and the political fallout
from the Carter Administration's use of foreign policy controls to embargo
wheat sales and sales of gas pipelines material to the Soviet Union, the
business community and the defense establishment were on a collison
course.
III. Congressional Action
A. 98TH CONGRESS-TEMPORARY EXTENSION
The 98th Congress failed to forge agreement for the renewal of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, requiring the enactment of simple, temporary
extensions when that law expired on September 30, 1983 and, ultimately,
extensions by the President under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 16 In addition to the jurisdictional and regulatory policy differ-
ences dividing the House and Senate, new issues appeared as riders to
several of the renewal bills introduced in the 98th Congress, chief among
which was Title III of H.R. 4230 positing restrictions on investment in and
trading with the Republic of South Africa.
Ultimately, both houses passed their versions of a renewal bill: H.R. 4230
and S. 979. Both bills were reported out with complete committee reports 17
which, together with the "probable" conference report which was inserted
13. Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420.
14. 50 U.S.C. app. 2409.
15. 50 U.S.C. app. 2419.
16. 50 U.S.C. 1701-1706. The first extension of the S. 979 Act under IEEPA was prom-
ulgated on October 14, 1983 by Executive Order No. 12444 (48 Fed. Reg. 48215); the second
extension was promulgated on March 30, 1984 by Executive Order No. 12470 (49 Fed. Reg.
13099).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and S. Rep. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983).
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into the record even as the seven-month-long conference foundered,' 8
furnish an unusually rich legislative history.
B. 99TH CONGRESS-GETING ON
THE "FAST TRACK"
Congressional leaders in the 99th Congress expressed unequivocally their
desire to avoid a repetition of the bitter battle from which they had recently
emerged. Lobbyists for various industry interests and other leaders of the
business community also expressed concern that a full debate of the issues
could jeopardize many of the improvements incorporated in H.R. 4230 and
S. 979 that they had wrested with considerable effort (and, undoubtedly, at
great expense). With attention focusing on the federal budget deficit, the
MX missile appropriation, tax reform, and several other highly visible
issues, a great deal of pressure mounted to route renewal legislation onto a
"fast track" and keep the genie in the bottle.
Renewal bills embodying the near-compromise reflected in H.R. 4230
were marked up by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and reported
out as H.R. 1786 before the 1985 Easter recess. The Senate meanwhile
enacted a simple extension (S. 883) which was sent to the House where, for
all intents and purposes, it was replaced by H.R. 1786 on April 16, 1985, and
returned to the Senate for concurrence. Because the House tinkered with
some of the agreed provisions, the deal nearly fell apart again; however,
with considerable renegotiation and a few amendments, the Senate finally
receded to the House version on June 25, and the bill was sent to the White
House. Even with a "fast track" renewal, the House managers again submit-
ted a full report accompanying H.R. 1786 as well as a joint explanatory
statement of the conference. '9
C. EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL DEADLOCK
Despite mounting uncertainties over the reach of the President's
emergency powers during the 1984 hiatus, 20 the Congressional deadlock
apparently had little effect on the day-to-day administration of export
controls. It was during this period, in fact, that the Commerce Department
overhauled completely the procedures governing the issuance and use of
distribution licenses. 2' and acceded to a Memorandum of Understanding
18. 130 CONG. REC. H12150 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
19. 131 CONG. REC. H4918 (daily ed. June 25, 1985).
20. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier had upheld the validity of an IEEPA
extension of the Export Administration Act in United States v. Spawr Optical, Inc., 685 F.2d
1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983), but such extensions cannot encompass
powers which only the Congress may expressly confer upon the President, e.g., the exclusion of
the Administrative Procedures Act provided in Sec. 13(a) of the law (50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a)).
See Nuclear Pacific, Inc. v. United States, Case No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash. 1984).
21. 50 Fed. Reg. 21, 562 (1985) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 373).
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with the Defense Department granting that agency concurrent licensing
jurisdiction over the export of certain "high tech" commodities and techni-
cal data to fifteen non-Nato "free world" destinations. 22
Similarly, most of the changes made by the 1985 Act will not have a
near-term effect on U.S. exporters. Procedural and policy changes found in
the 1985 Act, for the most part, will require significant time to be felt by the
vast majority of U.S. exporters; nonetheless, there are several features of
the 1985 Act which promise to have an immediate impact. These are found
in the amendments to sec. 5 (national security controls), sec. 6 (foreign
policy controls), sec. 10 (license application procedures), sec. 11 (viola-
tions), and sec. 12 (enforcement).
IV. Impact of Changes in the 1985 Act
A. NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS
One of the most important features of the 1985 Act is its silence with
reference to the People's Republic of China. S. 979 had included an addition
to sec. 5 which, in effect, imposed a blanket validated license requirement
with respect to all exports to "nuclear" countries other than NATO coun-
tries and countries which had ratified and complied with the non-
proliferation treaty. That language would have included the People's Re-
public of China. The House had expressly stated, in its proposal, that
exports to the People's Republic of China should be subject to no greater
controls than exports to any friendly, non-aligned country. Neither version
appears in the 1985 Act, suggesting that exports to the People's Republic of
China will continue to be subject to the same export licensing vagaries as has
been the case for the past several years.
Another potentially significant amendment of sec. 5 is the requirement
that the Control List (formerly, the Commodity Control List) be reviewed
annually, and that the annual reviews include a review of at least one-third
of the COCOM list. To the extent that these more frequent reviews result in
a reduction in the numbers of controlled commodities, annual reviews could
have a materially beneficial effect upon U.S. exporters. Whether this will be
the result, of course, is an open issue. In that same vein is the provision of the
1985 Act declaring that the presence of an imbedded microprocessor in a
particular commodity ipso facto will not give rise to its control.
The amendments regarding the foreign availability issue represent the
22. The Memorandum of Understanding is classified; however, it undoubtedly ameliorated
the dispute between the House and Senate over the "10(g)" amendments, in which the Senate
sought overall concurrent jurisdiction for the Defense Department in reference to licenses for
all exports of commodities and technical data controlled because of national security considera-
tions. See H.R. Rep. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. H4905,
4922 (daily ed. June 25, 1985).
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potentially most far-reaching improvements to the 1979 Act. Until this time,
foreign availability was a meaningful concept only to those within the family
of regulatory agencies who accepted its premise. The 1985 Act partially
shifts the burden of proof regarding foreign availability to the Commerce
Department, and further requires the Secretary of Commerce to attempt to
eliminate foreign availability of controlled commodities by negotiating with
the foreign governments concerned. The 1985 Act also establishes for the
first time an Office of Foreign Availability within the Commerce Depart-
ment, and requires the Department to promulgate regulations regarding
foreign availability.
Finally, the 1985 Act incorporates improvements with respect to exports
of relatively low-technology controlled commodities to COCOM countries
which, if effective, will ensure U.S. exporters' ability to ship within fifteen to
thirty days from submission of the application for a validated export license.
B. FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS
Foreign policy controls have been the source of a great deal of con-
troversy, both within the United States and abroad. The Senate version of
the renewal legislation endeavored to prohibit the retroactive application of
foreign policy controls to any contract in existence at the time of their
imposition. The House version of the renewal legislation addressed this
point as well, but enumerated several exceptions to the so-called "contract
sanctity" rule. The latter version is embodied in the 1985 Act.
Another serious concern not resolved by the 1985 Act is the issue of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. This matter was hotly and publicly
debated when the United States Government, in response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, ordered all U.S. firms and their foreign sub-
sidiaries not to honor contracts in relation to the construction of the Soviet
gas pipeline to Western Europe. In fact, several instances arose in that
period in which foreign courts directed subsidiaries of U.S. firms within their
jurisdictions not to obey these U.S. edicts.23 The House of Representatives
endeavored to limit the application of U.S. export controls to the export of
goods or technology produced in the United States, but the conference
committee receded to the Senate position. As stated in the draft conference
report:
Extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls affecting non-contractual
transactions and relationships remains a serious matter of contention and strain
upon U.S. relations with other countries, particularly with European govern-
23. See, e.g., Compagnie Europeene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V., 22 I.L.M.
66 (1983). See also, European Community: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning
Trade with U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982).
VOL. 20, NO. I
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT 373
ments, and possible ways of further limiting such effects merit continued study and
consideration.24
C. EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION PROCEDURES
As finally worked out between the House of Representatives and the
Senate, the amendments to sec. 10 of the Export Administration Act reduce
by one-third the times permitted for each phase of the application review
process. The amendments further impose on the Commerce Department
the obligation to advise applicants of its intention to deny an application and
the reasons therefor, and to allow applicants an opportunity to address the
issues raised.
One very serious issue raised during the 98th Congress was the attempt by
the Senate to confer upon the Defense Department the right to review all
applications for exports to any country to which exports are controlled for
national security purposes-the so-called "10(g) amendments." The confer-
ence committee was unable to resolve this issue which, together with the
addition of the anti-apartheid provisions found in Title III as proposed by
the House, was largely responsible for the failure of the Congress to pass the
renewal legislation last year. Both of these provisions have been eliminated
from the 1985 Act.
D. VIOLATIONS
Although some of the amendments effected by the 1985 Act to sec. 11
reaffirm existing law-for example, the concept of general criminal intent
and the insulation of administrative sanctions from judicial review-others
significantly expand legal concepts of culpability to include conspiracy and
attempts to violate the Act.
E. ENFORCEMENT
As mentioned earlier, one of the battles fought during the 98th Congress
concerned the shared enforcement roles of the Commerce Department and
the Customs Service. The Senate originally attempted to shift most enforce-
ment jurisdiction from Commerce to Customs, while the House of Repre-
sentatives attempted to expand the capacity of the Commerce Department
in its enforcement role while preserving the notion of shared responsibility.
The conference committee agreed to continue the Commerce Depart-
ment's exclusive authority to impose civil penalties under sec. 11 of the Act
and to enforce the anti-boycott provisions found in sec. 8. Concurrent
enforcement authority is maintained with respect to both pre- and post-
24. 130 CONG. REC. H12153 (daily ed. Oct. 11. 1984).
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license investigations, but the ability of Commerce Department personnel
to conduct investigations at U.S. ports is subject to Customs' concurrence.
Commerce Department enforcement personnel are given broader enforce-
ment authority, including the power to execute warrants, carry firearms,
and to make arrests if "probable cause" exists. Finally, the 1985 Act
attempts to clarify the authority of Customs personnel to conduct investiga-
tions of possible export violations at U.S. borders, and specifically grants
authority to Customs to make arrests without warrants under certain legal
restrictions.
This discussion necessarily barely scratches the surface of what Congress-
man Bonker has characterized as "an exceedingly complex bill." 25 To the
extent that these amendments will be reflected in licensing and enforcement
activities in the near future, they bear close scrutiny.
25. 130 CONG. REC. H12150 (daily ed. Oct. 11. 1984).
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